Clustering in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) attracted academia and industry alike due to the wide range of their applications. However, such networks suffer from limited energy sources. One of the solutions to the energy problem in WSNs is clustering. Therefore, many algorithms have been proposed for efficient clustering. One of the most famous clustering algorithms is Hybrid Energy Efficient Distributed Clustering protocol (HEED). This algorithm proved to be an efficient algorithm in terms of energy saving. At the same time, security is another challenge for WSNs due to the critical information transferred through the network. In this paper, we propose a modified HEED algorithm, entitled S2HEED, in which a fuzzy logic is used to enhance the cluster head selection criteria for efficient distribution in the field. In addition, we propose a security framework that can be used along with HEED for security purposes. We believe that merging the security with clustering will be beneficial to the energy saving in WSN. Based on extensive experiments, our proposals in this paper show that fuzzy logic approach prolongs the lifetime of the WSN and the proposed security framework protects the network from different attacks like Sinkhole, Sybil attack, Hello flooding attack and selective forwarding in addition of the replay attack.
I. Introduction
WSN is one of the networks with fast growing applications especially with the advances in MEMS technology. It has been used in many applications such as agriculture [1] and environmental monitoring [2] . However, some of these applications are critical in which secure data transfer is essential. Some of these applications are in battle field and health monitoring [3] . However sensors used in such applications suffer from scarce energy source, small memory footprint, and limited processing as well as limited communication capabilities. Therefore, the most challenge that faces any WSN designer is the energy consumption. Thus, efficient energy protocols are introduced in different layers in WSNs. For example, energy consumption is considered in sensors hardware technology, routing, data management [4] [5], clustering [6] [7] and security [8] [9] .
It has been also noticed that most of the current WSN applications are based on hierarchical structure to the nodes due to their efficient data processing. This leads to the introduction of many clustering algorithms [10] where in cluster-based networks, nodes are organized into clusters, with Cluster Heads (CHs) relaying messages from cluster members to the base station (BS). Clustered WSNs were proposed to allow scalability of the network and for energy efficiency. One of the most famous clustering algorithms is Hybrid Energy Efficient Distributed Clustering protocol (HEED) proposed in [10] . HEED is considered as one of the extensions to Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [11] [12] which is considered the most famous clustering algorithm.
HEED was proposed to balance energy drainage among nodes where sensor nodes send their messages to their CH. The CH, then, aggregates the messages, and sends only the aggregated data to the BS. To avoid energy drainage of sensors, CH memberships are randomly rotated among all nodes in the network, leading to load balancing in sensor nodes. Each round has predetermined duration with two phases, setup phase where nodes elect CH and steady state phase where nodes send data to their CHs. We believe that with rotating CH membership periodically, it became harder for an adversary to identify the CHs and compromise them, thus no need for high cost tamper proof for specific nodes to avoid their capture. On the other hand, sensors might be deployed in unattended and insecure environments. Nodes might be physically captured and/or their messages among them may be intercepted and modified by an adversary.
LEACH and its extensions like HEED build their CH relationship selection upon probabilistic models. However these CHs may not evenly distributed in the monitored field. This can leads to large fraction of nodes to be un-clustered which will be forced to communicate directly with BS
II. Overview
For the paper to be self content, this section reviews some of the clustering techniques used in WSNs, focusing on HEED protocol, as a base for our proposed security algorithm. Then the section reviews some of the currently used key management techniques. Finally it states the concept of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), as a start point to introduce our proposed security scheme.
A. Clustering in WSNs
As mentioned, the most important factor of sensor network is the sensor lifespan, which is determined by how fast the sensor consumes energy [11] . Nodes are randomly deployed for detecting events and monitoring areas [6] , gathering and sending sensed data to the BS. So, energy is consumed in sensing events as well as in radio transmissions. In fact, using the antenna for sending radio messages is the most energy consuming factor, directly proportional with the distance between the sender and receiver. Without clustering, nodes are forced to send data directly to the BS (sink node), which can be multiple hops away from the node, causing fast depletion of the limited residual energy and leading to rapid death of nodes in the field.
Clustering aims to divide the nodes into cluster groups, with a representative of each group called cluster head. The CH is responsible for collecting data form nodes in the cluster, aggregating them and finally sends the aggregated data to the BS. The CH membership operates for a period of time; after that the cluster nodes are in need to re-select another CH to take the lead for the current time interval. Clustered sensor networks have been proved to increase system throughput and prolong lifetime. In-addition, rotating cluster head membership balances energy load among all nodes.
One of the famous clustering algorithms is the LEACH, which is an energy efficient protocol; proposed in [11] [12] . The idea behind LEACH is the formation of clusters of nodes based on received signal strength (RSS). The node becomes a CH for the current round if randomly generates a number less than certain threshold T(n) as given in equation (1), where p is the desirable percentage to be CH, r is the current round while G is set of nodes that have not been selected as CHs.
Similar to LEACH, HEED is proposed in [10] . HEED extends the choice of the CH using the residual energy of the node as a primary parameter. On the other hand it uses the intra-cluster communication cost as the secondary parameter. Each node broadcasts its cost and performs neighbor discovery. Finally sets its probability to be CH as follows: (2) Where the initial percentage of cluster heads among n nodes, is the residual energy in the node while is the initially max energy of the node. H-HEED [10] applies the same concept of HEED with utilizing heterogeneous nodes instead of homogenous nodes. However, this change would not affect our proposals in this paper. Therefore, our algorithm would work with both HEED and H-HEED.
B. Key Management Techniques in WSNs
The early schemes proposed for key management in WSNs assumed that resource constraints on nodes prevent them from using public key cryptography. Therefore, key materials should be pre-loaded before deployment in each sensor node [18] . Basic schemes like unique random key assume that each node is pre-loaded by unique key of itself and the unique keys of all other nodes in the network. However this introduces huge storage overhead, where each must store (n-1) keys besides its own unique key, where n is the number of nodes in the network. Other schemes propose using a single master key by all nodes. Although no storage overhead considered in such scheme, however the compromise of even a single node would reveal the master key and allow decryption of all nodes' traffic. One variant is to establish a set of link keys with other neighbor nodes, then erase the master key. This might be acceptable in static network, where it is not allowed new nodes to be deployed [9] .
Eschenauer et al. proposed a basic random key pre-distribution scheme [18] , where large key pool S is generated first. Then, each sensor randomly selects m distinct keys form this key pool, and stores them in its internal memory. Nodes can only communicate after deployment, if there is at least one common key. Otherwise these nodes will be in need of other nodes help establishing a path key between them. Although this technique needs less memory and can guarantee high probability of sharing common key between two nodes. Small number of compromised nodes will disclose a large fraction of secrets, as single key may be shared by more than two nodes. Chan et al. [8] , for more resilience against node capture, proposed q-composite scheme where, for two nodes to communicate, need to share at least q keys. However this modified version added communication over-head on the nodes, as the probability of sharing q keys become less than sharing one key.
Another more powerful scheme is the polynomial key pre-distribution scheme where the setup server randomly generates a bivariate t-degree polynomial f(x,y) over finite field. For a node with ID i, the server computes polynomial share of f(i,y) which is pre-loaded for node i. After deployment, nodes i and j, can compute common key f(i,j) as follows:
Although no communication overhead introduced, as what is needed is the ID of the other node, each node might need to store the shared polynomials [8] [9] .
A completely different approach is the usage of trusted third party, acts as a key distribution center (KDC). Similar to the Needham-Schroeder protocol, KDC generates a unique secret key for two nodes upon request. However the establishment of a secret key is a side effect, where each node shares a long-term key with the KDC [20] , exerts high communication cost. Nodes located in the vicinity of the KDC have to forward all requests for link keys from the rest of the nodes, which drains the batteries of these nodes. On the other hand, Chan and Perrig [20] introduce Peer Intermediaries for Key Establishment (PIKE), a key establishment protocol uses ordinary nodes as trusted intermediaries for the generation of link keys. Both the communication cost and memory overhead scale linearly with the number of nodes in the network.
Localized encryption and authentication protocol (LEAP) proposes that each sensor node can establish pair-wise keys with its immediate neighbor, during two phases named the key setup phase and key discovery phase. In the key setup phase, nodes receive a general key. Any node, using this key and one-way hash function, generates its master key. In the shared key discovery phase nodes broadcast their Ids, then each node can generate the shared key, simply by applying the hash function on the other node's Id [21] . However, the network security depends on the general key, which can be compromised by capturing of a single sensor node. It is possible to compromise all the session keys generated once this general key is compromised.
These previously described schemes were mainly designed for homogeneous sensors and they lake the flexibility offered by the public-key cryptography based solutions, as node authentication, identity verification, and authenticated broadcast [7] , in addition of ensuring network robustness. Fortunately enough, using ECC as a light weighted public key cryptography could be feasible for WSNs in which it depends on small key size and compact signatures required to achieve the needed security level as proved by the authors of [28] [29] . As each node is pre-loaded by private and public keys, beside the necessary procedures for checking other nodes public key certificate, adversary cannot impersonate node, except by capturing it. In addition, capturing node, does not affect the security of the rest nodes, as no reveal to their private keys. The adversary cannot fabricate public and private keys to pretend to be one of the nodes, as the authenticated public keys, signed by the setup server, are pre-loaded in the nodes. So any node can check the pretended public key and can easily refuse it.
Reza in [18] introduced a key management scheme for cluster based WSNs using ECC cryptography. He considered WSN with a combination of number of ordinary sensor nodes and gateways. Gateways are considered more powerful nodes than ordinary nodes in terms of energy and processing capabilities. In addition, gateways are assumed tamper resistant nodes. Nodes also assumed to be aware of their locations in the monitored field either by using GPS or through one of the estimated methods. Before deployment phase, each gateway is pre-loaded with public keys of all other nodes in the field, its own public, private key, and the public key of the BS. An ordinary sensor node is assumed also to be preloaded with the public keys of all gateways as well as its own public and private keys. Rui in [27] , used the same concept in securing WSN while merging the ECC cryptography with t-degree trivariate symmetric polynomial. The algorithm considered a node to be either H sensor with high power or L sensor with lower power. H sensor assumed to have larger storage space and also assumed to be tamper proof.
Both [18] and [27] as well other schemes propose static membership for nodes. Such schemes assume nodes either with high or low power levels must store some set of public keys of other nodes in the whole network. Certainly a large overhead is introduced especially with large-scale networks which is the common case for WSNs. In addition, both assume that nodes are tamper proof which is costly to be considered in WSNs.
Obviously, from the previous discussion, ECC cryptography seems to be the best fit for WSNs. However, the previous proposed algorithms suffer from one or more of the following weak points:
 They require geographical information to properly work.  They build their algorithm assuming that the network contains heterogeneous type of sensors and they can easily arrange them in a form of clusters with high power node associated with each cluster.  They did not consider the dynamicity of the WSNs due to mobility and/or energy depleted nodes. Therefore, nodes might need to be frequently re-clustered as it clearly appears in HEED for instance.
So our proposed scheme in this paper tries to solve the previously mentioned problems by utilizing the features of the clustering algorithms. In this paper, we will take one of the famous clustering algorithms, HEED, as a base for our proposal. We benefit from the HEED CH rotation to be hard on the attacker to target one or more CHs in the network. In addition, based on this feature, our proposed algorithm does not need to assume tamper proofed CHs. Moreover, our proposal in this paper avoids loading the nodes with large number of keys; each node only needs to have its neighbors' keys only. Certainly, such proposal significantly saves the memory footprint of the security algorithm and reduces the number of exchanged messages among nodes for security purposes.
C. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The main techniques for public key cryptography are ECC, RSA and Diffie-Hellman. But, these schemes were thought to be heavy weight and expensive in terms of both computational and communication capabilities of sensor node. Recently, several researches have improved public key cryptography for WSNs. For instance, Malan at al. [28] demonstrated that a lightweight type of public key cryptography ECC is computationally feasible for resource constrained sensor nodes. Tiny-ECC proposed by Liu and Ning, as ECC libraries for software implementations of sensor networks. Also, it is possible to use Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for signing and verifying messages [30] .
An elliptic curve E over a prime field Fp can be defined as the set of all tuples [20] [23] satisfying the following equation:
These tuples are called points with x and y referred to as coordinates. The set of points together with a special point O (point at infinity) allows one to form a commutative group with O being the identity element. The group operation is the addition of points, which can be performed through arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, squaring, and inversion) in the underlying field. The order of an elliptic curve group is the number of Fp -rational points on the curve E, plus one for O. It is well known from Hasse's theorem that #E(Fp) holds the following rule:
Before any ECC key exchange, the order #E(Fp) should be a large prime factor. The involved parties have to agree upon a common set of domain parameters, which specify the finite field Fp, the elliptic curve E (the coefficients a, b  Fp), a base point P  E(Fp) generating a cyclic subgroup of large order, the order n of this subgroup, and the co-factor h = #E(Fp )/n.
In elliptic curve cryptography, a private key is an integer k chosen randomly from the interval [1, n − 1]. The corresponding public key is the point Q = k · P on the curve. Given k and P, the point Q = k · P can be obtained by means of an operation called scalar multiplication. While a scalar multiplication of the form Q = k · P can be calculated quite efficiently, the inverse operation, of finding k when P and Q are given, is a hard mathematical problem known as the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) requires fully exponential time, if the domain parameters were chosen with care.
In contrast, the best algorithm for solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) has a subexponential running time. As a consequence, elliptic curve crypto-systems can use much shorter keys compared to their classical versions based on the DLP [20] [23].
D. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic initiated in 1965 by Zadeh, is a powerful method that deals with problems of uncertainties. Uncertainties is a form of many-valued logic that deals with reasoning using approximate rather than fixed values. Fuzzy logic is a multi-valued logic that allows intermediate values to be defined between conventional evaluations like true/false, yes/no, high/low, etc. It has been used to handle the concept of partial truth using linguistic variables that may range between completely true and completely false. Fuzzy set contains elements that belong to a graded membership function within interval [0, 1], not crisp set where each element belongs to specific set [19] [20] . A fuzzy logic controller consists of sequence of steps, starting with fuzzifier step that takes the crisp input from the system and determines the degree that it belongs to the appropriate fuzzy sets. Then, fuzzy rules step that are conditional statements according to Mamadani method is in the form of:
IF a is A THEN b is B
where a and b are linguistic variables and A and B are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on the universe of discourse X and Y, respectively. The output rules aggregation is the function of the inference engine step. Finally the defuzzifier step is to transfer the fuzzy output to the crisp output back to control the desired system. Fuzzy logic can be used for wireless sensor networks taking uncertainty in the clustering parameters into consideration. It allows using multiple parameters in the cluster head election phase.
As previously mentioned, in HEED algorithm each node bases its CH selection upon its residual energy as primary parameter while taking into consideration the intra-cluster communication as secondary parameter. However, for efficient cluster selection this paper proposes a cost function based on fuzzy logic where a node can announce itself as CH or not.
The fuzzy variables taken into consideration while calculating this cost by node is:
 Centrality factor: summation average of the distances between the node and neighbor nodes within its range.  Connectivity factor: number of neighbor nodes within its range.
We limit the linguistic variables used to describe the crisp input to three variables which are low, medium and high for the residual energy and connectivity factor parameters while far, adequate and close for centrality factor parameter as shown in figures 1, 2, and 3. The fuzzy set for the output which is the score of the node to announce itself as a cluster head is represented using five linguistic variables which are very low, low, medium, high, and very high as shown in figure 4 using AND operation. For the final step which is the defuzzification process is done by COG (center of gravity) of the output using the following equation: (5) where is the membership function of set A.
III. S2HEED: Secure Hierarchical Clustering
In this section, we introduce our security scheme in details. The aim is to secure heterogeneous sensor networks using hybrid key management technique of the lightweight public key cryptography (ECC) and short pairwise symmetric key. Our algorithm starts its operation before the clustering phase and falls into four phases as follows:
Phase 1: Pre-deployment Key Distribution Phase
Initially, before sensor node deployment, since the number of sensor nodes in any application is usually large, each node is assumed to be preloaded with some of the required key materials. Each node is pre-loaded with ECC private (PR) and public (PU) key pair signed by the BS in addition to a unique identifier ID. Nodes are assumed to be able to run the ECDSA algorithm [30] to validate the authenticity of any other node's public key certificate. Each node must be preloaded with the fuzzy module for its score calculation, and all appropriate operations for that.
Phase 2: Cluster Head Announcement
This phase starts along with the first HEED setup-phase. With the proposed fuzzy logic approach for CH selection, all nodes whom find themselves capable to operate as CHs announce themselves as CHs to their neighbors. These announcements could be on the following format: (6) As shown in equation (6), each of the node broadcasts a message holding its fuzzy score, its public key PU and ID. These messages are broadcasted with a low power level L to be heard by small set of nodes. Each node within the range L saves the received CH ID and its public key PU. The candidate CH with the highest score within all neighbors, becomes the CH of this round, and starts the next phase. Using these fuzzy score announcements, no two cluster heads will be close to each other in the field as the highest one will win the cluster head membership. Thus cluster heads of each round are apart from each others to cover the rest of the nodes.
Phase 3: CHs Tree Construction
After the CHs were chosen from the previous phase, a tree rooted at the Base Station (BS) to every other CH will be formed in this phase. Such tree guarantees connectivity of the network as well as helping ensuring the security.
After completing the clustering phase, nodes that were selected to be CHs, send a Join-TreeRequest to join the tree. Join-Tree-Request message contains the cluster head PU, ID, and random value (nonce to avoid replay attack). These messages will be sent using a power level R which is greater than L. Other CHs save the messages heard and verify the received public keys, with no immediate reply.
Once the BS hears from the closest CHs, it saves their IDs and verifies their public keys. Then, the BS replies with Accept-Tree-Joining or Reject-Tree-Joining message based on received public key verification. Sometimes, the CH capability cannot handle more than certain number of CHs; so the Reject-Tree-Joining message is set for that purpose too. Accept-Tree-Joining message consists of "1st level" notification (this cluster head is in the 1st level of cluster heads tree), Session key (small symmetric key for future communication) and f(Nonce) where f is certain function exerted on the Nonce ensuring the authorization of the sender. This message is encrypted using node's public key of this ID.
Consequently, the first level CHs, will reply to all previously saved CHs, with message holding "2nd level" notification, Session key and f(Nonce), encrypted using node's public key of such CH. Figure 5 shows the steps taken by the CHs in this phase. This process is repeated till a tree of CHs is constructed, as shown in Figure 6 . To avoid looping during tree construction, any CH must have one lower numbered node (in terms of tree level(M)) as parent CH and any higher CHs as children as depicted in Figure 7 . To break the tie, if CH receives more than one message from different lower numbered CHs, it selects its potential parent based on one or more criteria such as tree level (M), Received Signal Strength (RSS), Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), cluster head ID or any other criteria.
Phase 4: Clusters Formation
Till this point, each CH knows its level in the tree. At the same time, each node knows its neighbor CH's ID and public key. To form the clusters, each CH sends Join-Me request to all of its neighbors with power L. This message is now encrypted by the CH's private key and contains its ID, a new random number (nonce), the CH's tree level (M), and the Join-Me code. Cluster nodes can decrypt this message and verifies the nodes' ID. Such scenario is illustrated in equation (7) as follows. (7) The node might select its potential CH based on one or more criteria such as tree level (8). (8) Aiming that the CH heard its public key before, otherwise the CH broadcasts list of the IDs with no public key heard before. In such case, each node within the list broadcasts message contains its ID and its public key, to be saved by all its neighbors as given in equation (9) . This list decreases significantly as each ordinary node will broadcast its public key once to be saved by others, which leads significant save in energy. (9) Now, clusters are formed as well as the tree is established. However, instead of using public private key for further transmission between the nodes and their CH, one extra message (S-Key message) is transmitted from the CH to its cluster nods will be sent to notify them by their session keys. In addition, along with the message, CH can associate the time slot for each cluster head member due to the used TDMA in the steady state phase of HEED. The S-Key message is shown in equation (10) . (10) No reply attack can take place even when each node broadcasts its public key, because of the encrypted random numbers (Nonce) in equations (7), (8) and (10) .
IV. Network Maintenance
In this section, we introduce some possible maintenance scenarios and how these scenarios can be handled by our proposed scheme.
A. Re-clustering
After the current steady-state phase, a new setup phase starts. Nodes apply the fuzzy logic approach and based on the generated scores, they may announce themselves as cluster heads. A cluster head may broadcast a message contains its ID, its current fuzzy score and its current cluster head as well as its current cluster level in the tree, with power L. Any node hears this announcement sends a verification message to the specified cluster head using the previously established session key. The selection will be according to the highest score of the heard announcements with respect each node. In some cases some of the nodes that are out of the same new node cluster hear from the new cluster head, these nodes have to go through a chain verification sequence. Once the specified cluster head verifies the new cluster head, nodes start to deal with it safely. Again, to form the tree, new cluster heads send a Join-Tree-Request message with power level R associated with their current cluster head ID and level. Any cluster head hears this message needs to verify their honesty either by contacting the specified cluster head or by going to the BS. Once nodes are verified, CHs Tree Construction phase is repeated. Figure 8 shows new CH verification process through current cluster head.
B. Adding New Node Protocol
For a new node to join the network there should be a secure way to add only trusted nodes. A new node sends a New-Join-Request including its ID to its neighbors encrypted by its public key. The closest cluster heads forward such message, along the tree, up to the BS for verification. The BS replies back with a verification message (Verified) encrypted by the cluster heads public keys. These cluster heads within the new node range reply to the new node by Join-Me message as in equation (7). The node replies to one of them by a Join-Accept message as in equation (8) . Then the cluster head replies by S-Key message for session key establishment as in equation (10) . It can be noticed that any new node has to be registered at the BS before adding it to the network which is reasonable assumption. This scenario is summarized in Figure 9 .
C. Removing a Node Protocol
Removing a dead node within the cluster can be easily done by CH, as dead node will not send data during its time-slot for number of iterations. CH then broadcasts message holding the ID and the public key of this node, and cluster nodes mark it as dead node with no further deal even if it comes back to life. This introduces additional difficulty on the intruder, who physically compromises a node, and able to extract its keys.
D. Orphan Adoption Protocol
It is assumed that there is a mean for nodes to detect the unavailability of their cluster head by periodically pending the cluster head or using the concept of watchdog [23] . Once the nodes recognize that they are now orphan they start the orphan adoption protocol. The orphan adoption protocol is based on the concept of the BS knows all of the private and public keys of all nodes. An orphan node sends an Orphan-Adoption request that will be heard by all of the current cluster heads in its range. The cluster heads propagate this message to the base station for verification. Once verified by the base station, the cluster heads now offer the node to join their clusters and the node reply by its acceptance to one of them. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 10 .
V. Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. Experiments are performed on our own simulation written on Matlab. In our simulation, we use N as the number of nodes N=1000 deployed in an area A=1000 x 1000 m2. Nodes transmission range is set to L=100m while the cluster heads transmission range is set to R=300m for communication between cluster heads along the tree. The initial energy of the node is assumed to be 1J. Simulation results are under the assumption that any node can be a cluster head once during the whole network lifetime. To test our proposal in this paper, the selected energy model follows the footsteps the one proposed in [24] . The energy expended during transmission for a M bit message for a distance d is as shown in equation (11): (11) where is the energy dissipated by turning the radio circuit for either sending or receiving and its value is equal to 50 nJ/bit. is the energy dissipated using the transmitter amplifier and its value is equal to 100 pJ/bit/ . is the path loss exponent and equal to 2 within the intracommunication and 2.5 for the inter-communication. On the other hand, energy expended during receiving M bit message is as shown in equation (12): (12) In addition, for simplicity, the size of the message sent by a node to its CH as well as that of the aggregated message sent by the CH is set to 4000 bit message. A160-bit ECC as the key primitive is computed according to the experiments done in [31] . 40 bytes used for public key and 20 bytes used for private key as well as 12 bytes for node's id. In addition, the ECDSA takes only 56.4KB from ROM and 1.7KB RAM. Moreover, the verification process takes 2.85 seconds on MICAz node. The ECC usage possibility on WNSs was proved in [32] . The authors built their analysis on Berkeley/Crossbow motes platform. They use Mica2dot and found that ECDSA-160 and 224 are more efficient in terms of security, energy consumed on signing and ECC operations compared to the RSA-1024 and RSA-2048.
A. Storage Analysis
Assume that the network contains N sensor nodes. The sensor node ni in the network should be pre-loaded with ECC private and public key pair (PRi,PUi) before deployment. After bootstrapping and clustering, each sensor node receives the public key of its CH and m-1 neighbor nodes public keys for the network's first round and these keys will be saved for future use, where m is the number of expected neighbors of each node that can be calculated knowing the network density and transmission range of sensor nodes. Assuming that the transmission range of each node within the cluster is L; then the average number of neighbors for each sensor node is as follows [18] : (13) In addition there is a session key with the CH. Therefore, the total number of keys in each node will be Pn=2+m+1. It is clear that P n is not the same for all nodes since CHs after their round remove all session keys with other nodes, nodes also remove the public key of the old CH as no way to be CH again. CHs during their round, carry m public keys and m session keys with cluster nodes and the public key and the session key for upper parent CH as well as n public keys and n session keys for lower children CHs due to the tree structure. However, session keys require small memory storage compared to that of the public keys.
To prove the superiority of our proposed scheme, the proposed scheme is compared to the ones proposed in reference [18] and [27] as shown in Table ( 1). The comparison takes into consideration the number of ECC keys held by each node type with different networks' density where storage needed for other symmetric keys is negligible. For Reza schemes in [18] and Rui in [27] , it is assumed that gateways, H and CH sensors represents 10% of the total nodes. It is clear from the Table that our proposed scheme, provides huge save in terms of required keys to be saved by each node. Consequently, it saves the memory required for the pre-loaded ECC keys for each node. On the other hand, both Reza and Rui schemes require huge number of keys especially with large-scale networks. For instance, the gateway is required to hold 9003 keys and the H nodes are required to save 11003 keys when a network of 10,000 nodes are constituted. On the other hand, only 84 keys are required to be carried by the CH of our security scheme.
B. Transmission Overhead
In the proposed scheme, typically each sensor node broadcasts its public key twice; one within cluster with power L to be saved by neighbors and another with power R to join the tree. This leads to significant save in energy consumed for transmission, prolong the network lifetime and increase system throughput. At the same time, ECC has small message expansion for encryption with little more power consumption and low over head [18] .
As shown in the previous section, the total number of neighbors in a typical network is about 31 nods. This value is confirmed by the simulation results as shown in Figure 11 . As can be seen the Figure, the number of nodes increases in a cluster with the increase of the communication range of the nodes. For instance, with a communication range of 130m, average transmission range for most of the commercial sensor nodes, the average number of nodes per cluster is almost 35. Figure 12 shows, the impact of varying the random number chosen by each node on the total number of CHs in the network. Thus, as the random value threshold decreases, the number of CHs increases in which it increases the connectivity of the network.
As stated before, using fuzzy logic for CH membership selection during different setup phases decreases the number of un-clustered nodes and leads to the prolonging network life by decreasing energy dissipation. This conclusion is verified in Tables (2) and (3) where they hold a comparison between clustering with and without fuzzy logic in terms of number of un-clustered nodes and number of CHs respectively. As mentioned, un-clustered nodes are forced to communicate directly with the BS, leading to faster energy depletion of the node. As shown in the tables, with nearly the same number of CHs during different rounds between the fuzzy logic and the probabilistic model, the number of un-clustered nodes decreases dramatically using fuzzy logic approach compared to that of the probabilistic model. And this is because of the efficient distribution of CHs in the field to cover large fraction of sensor nodes each round to decrease the number of un-clustered nodes. This is incomparable to the probabilistic model of the basic HEED, which may leads to random selection of cluster heads that cover small fraction of nodes and cause large fraction of un-clustered nodes. For instance, in Table ( 2), in the first round, the number of un-clustered nodes in the HEED without the Fuzzy approach (probabilistic model) is 234 out of 1000 nodes. On the other hand, when fuzzy logic approach is used the number of unclustered nodes is reduced almost by half to reach 135 nodes. This amount of reduction is repeated on other rounds as well. Table ( 3) shows another advantage of using fuzzy logic where the number of CHs per round is reduced by a reasonable amount. From the first glance, this result seems disadvantage; however, the number of CHs is reduced but distributed over the monitored field for efficient cover of large fraction of sensor nodes deployed in the field. This is confirmed in Figures 13 and 14 . Figure 14 shows the efficient distribution of CHs by covering the whole area using fuzzy logic compared to that of basic probabilistic model of HEED given in Figure 13 . Figure 15 shows the cluster head tree formation after node selection by probabilistic model, although it is not proposed originally by HEED, and by fuzzy logic model. As can be seen, in (a) CHs at the tree nodes nearly cover the whole area using the fuzzy logic module compared to the same tree done using the probabilistic model in (b). Using this tree for communication between CHs and the sink node decreases the energy dissipated by the far CHs and leads to prolongen the network average life time. Figure 16 shows the average remaining residual energy of the nodes after re-clustering rounds in both probabilistic and fuzzy models. As can be seen, the fuzzy model increases the lifetime of the network through the average residual energy in nodes in the network. This enhancement done by the fuzzy model apparently becomes clear after a set of a number of rounds as shown in the Figure. Figure 17 depicts the average rate of energy consumption per node with number of iterations. Again, the figure confirms that the fuzzy logic model is much better than the probabilistic model in terms of nodes energy saving. For instance, the fuzzy model allows the network to stay alive for more than 30 rounds while the network dies after 23 rounds using the probabilistic model.
C. Security Analysis
After bootstrapping, each node enters neighbors' discovery phase to receive the public keys of the neighbors. During clustering phase, each node agrees on one session key with its CH that allows verification of the identity of the node, while the adversary is unable to impersonate the identity except by capturing the node. So this hybrid method supports data confidentiality, integrity and node authentication. The usage of public key cryptography gives the security issue more power and flexibility of creating and updating session keys besides node authentication, identity verification and authenticated broadcast. Public key cryptography prevents a huge set of famous attacks on the network as Sinkhole, Sybil attack, Hello flooding attack and selective forwarding as shown in figure 18 , in addition of the replay attack which is prevented using nonce. This paper assumes that there are no attackers for only the first HEED setup-phase, where the public keys are broadcasted in plain messages. However, the rest of the network life-time is protected from these attacks, using encrypted messages. Obviously capturing node reveals no information about the links that are not directly involved in communication with the compromised node as no reveal for their private keys; so it does not affect the security of the rest of the nodes. The CH membership rotation idea besides the proposed handling to the removal of a node exerts additional difficulty on the intruder.
For power proof, we introduce some possible attach scenarios and how network will be secured using our scheme. Figure 19 declares the attacking scenario, if the attacker does not have private and public key pair signed by the BS for his own usage; the attacker will be discarded from the first step by neighbor nodes using ECDSA while not being able to join the tree to get his tree level indicator. Assuming the attacker was able to fake this indicator, he/she will be discarded by neighbors in the last step for the incorrect value of the calculated nonce.
Sinkhole attack, where fake sinkhole is created while advertising for high quality routes, leads to almost all traffic to be attracted [26] . Our scheme can withstand using public key encryption and nonce, unless the attacker has a public and private key signed by the BS. HELLO flood attack, where nodes broadcast small packets after deployment for neighbor discovery, the attacker can simply advertises high quality route by advertise himself as CH or powerful node [26] . Our proposed scheme can withstand by encrypted HELLO messages as shown in phase 2 for bidirectional link verification, as this fake public key is not assigned by the BS. Selective forwarding attack, where the compromised nodes might forward selected packets to get neighbors' trust in the multi-hop fashion and might simply drop these packets. Our proposed scheme dealing with node removal in the network maintenance section can efficiently withstand this attack by simply discarding the compromised node even if it comes back to life.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a secure key management scheme for heterogonous hierarchical cluster-based WSN using hybrid key management technique between the lightweight public key cryptography ECC and pair-wise symmetric key cryptography for HEED based clustering algorithm. Our proposed scheme introduces a significant save in the required key materials to achieve full network connectivity compared to other schemes targeting heterogeneous networks. The scheme reduces the transmission overhead where each node broadcasts its public key two times, one for cluster formation and other to join the tree, while the other messages are secured by the symmetric key between the cluster head and the node.
The proposed scheme achieves high security level by using public key cryptography for node authentication, identity verification and broadcast authentication besides the short session keys after verification for future secure communication supports data confidentiality and integrity. The cluster head membership rotation introduces additional difficulties on the adversary, besides the proposal deals with the node removal. In addition our security scheme reduces the risk on other nodes in case of node capture as no reveal for any other node private key or any communication link security not directly involved in communication with the compromised node. Also using fuzzy logic for cluster head selection is proved to prolong the network lifetime in terms of decreasing number of un-clustered nodes. At the same time, the fuzzy logic results show efficient distribution over the monitored area compared to the probabilistic model of the basic HEED. Finally, the proposed scheme securely deals with various cases like adding new nodes, removing nodes, orphan nodes and re-clustering. 
